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Due to its ability to tolerate high channel loss, decoy-state quantum key distribution (QKD) has
been one of the main focuses within the QKD community. Notably, several experimental groups
have demonstrated that it is secure and feasible under real-world conditions. Crucially, however,
the security and feasibility claims made by most of these experiments were obtained under the
assumption that the eavesdropper is restricted to particular types of attacks or that the finite-key
effects are neglected. Unfortunately, such assumptions are not possible to guarantee in practice. In
this work, we provide concise and tight finite-key security bounds for practical decoy-state QKD
that are valid against general attacks.
Introduction. In 1984, Bennett and Brassard pro-
posed a quantum key distribution (QKD) scheme in
which a cryptographic key can be securely distributed
between two remote parties, Alice and Bob, in an un-
trusted environment [1]. Since then, this proposal (tra-
ditionally referred to as the BB84 protocol) has received
considerable attention, and significant progress has been
made in both theory and practice [2].
In actuality, implementations of the BB84 protocol dif-
fer in some important aspects from the original theoret-
ical proposal. This is particularly the case in the choice
of the quantum information carrier, where a weak pulsed
laser source is used in place of an ideal single-photon
source (which is not yet available). However, pulsed laser
sources have a critical drawback in that a non-negligible
fraction of the emitted laser pulses contain more than one
photon, which an adversary, Eve, can exploit via the so-
called photon-number-splitting (PNS) attack [3]. In fact,
this attack has been shown to be extremely powerful, es-
pecially when the loss in the quantum channel connecting
Alice and Bob is high.
To tackle the PNS attack in the presence of high chan-
nel loss, most BB84 implementations (e.g., see Refs. [4–
14]) adopt the decoy-state method [15–17]. The ba-
sic idea is conceptually very simple, and more im-
portantly, it requires minimal modification to existing
BB84 implementations. Specifically, instead of preparing
phase-randomized laser pulses of the same mean photon-
number, Alice varies randomly and independently the
mean photon-number of each laser pulse she sends to
Bob. Crucially, by using the fact that the variation of
the mean photon-number is inaccessible to Eve, it is pos-
sible to detect the presence of photon-number-dependent
loss in the quantum channel, i.e., by analyzing the data
shared between Alice and Bob. As a result, photon-
number-dependent type of attacks are circumvented, and
the secret key rates and the tolerance to the channel loss
are significantly improved.
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The security of decoy-state QKD has been obtained
in the asymptotic regime [16, 17], i.e., in the limit of
infinitely long keys. In the case of finite-length keys,
several attempts have been made (e.g., see Refs. [18–21]),
but, most (if not all) of these results assume that Eve is
restricted to particular types of attacks. Very recently,
finite-key security bounds against general attacks have
been derived by Hayashi and Nakayama [22], although
the security analysis is rather involved.
In this work, we provide concise and tight finite-
key security bounds for a practical decoy-state QKD
protocol that are directly applicable to most current
decoy-state QKD implementations. The security analysis
is based on a combination of a recent security proof
technique [23, 24] and a novel finite-size analysis for the
decoy-state method, which allows us to greatly simplify
the security analysis. As a result, we are able to derive
tight finite-key security bounds that are valid against
general attacks. Moreover, these bounds can be straight-
forwardly computed with just five concise formulas (see
Eqs. (1)-(5)), which experimentalists can readily use
for their implementations. In addition, we evaluate the
performance of our security bounds by applying them
to a realistic fiber-based system model. The evaluation
shows that our security bounds are relatively tight, in
the sense that for realistic post-processing block sizes,
the achievable secret key rates are comparable to those
obtained in the asymptotic regime. In fact, for small
post-processing block sizes (of the order of 104 bits), we
observe that secret keys can be securely distributed over
a fiber length of up to 135 km.
Protocol Description. We consider an asymmetric
coding BB84 protocol [25], i.e., the bases X and Z are
chosen with probabilities that are biased. Specifically,
the bases X and Z are selected with probabilities qx
and 1 − qx, respectively, and the secret key is extracted
from the events whereby Alice and Bob both choose
the X basis. In addition, the protocol is based on the
transmission of phase-randomized laser pulses, and uses
two-decoy settings. The intensity of each laser pulse
is randomly set to one of the three intensities µ1, µ2
2and µ3, and the intensities satisfy µ1 > µ2 + µ3 and
µ2 > µ3 ≥ 0. Note, however, that our analysis can
also be straightforwardly generalized to any number of
intensity levels. Next, we provide a detailed description
of the protocol.
1. Preparation. Alice chooses a bit value uniformly
at random and records the value in yi. Then, she
selects a basis choice ai ∈ {X,Z} with probabilities
qx and 1 − qx, respectively, and an intensity choice
ki ∈ K := {µ1, µ2, µ3} with probabilities pµ1 , pµ2 and
pµ3 = 1− pµ1 − pµ2 , respectively. Finally, she prepares a
(weak) laser pulse based on the chosen values and sends
it to Bob via the quantum channel.
2. Measurement. Bob chooses a basis bi ∈ {X,Z} with
probabilities qx and 1 − qx, respectively. Then, he
performs a measurement in basis bi and records the
outcome in y′i. In practice, the measurement device is
usually implemented with two single-photon detectors.
In this case, there are four possible outcomes {0, 1, ∅,⊥}
where 0 and 1 are the bit values, and ∅ and ⊥ are the no
detection and double detection events, respectively. For
the first three outcomes, Bob assigns what he observes
to y′i, and for the last outcome ⊥ he assigns a random
bit value to y′i.
3. Basis reconciliation. Alice and Bob announce
their basis and intensity choices over an authenti-
cated public channel and identify the following sets:
Xk := {i : ai = bi = X ∧ ki = k ∧ y
′
i 6= ∅} and
Zk := {i : ai = bi = Z ∧ ki = k ∧ y′i 6= ∅} for all k ∈ K.
Then, they check for |Xk| ≥ nX,k and |Zk| ≥ nZ,k for
all values of k. They repeat step 1 to step 3 until these
conditions are satisfied. We denote as N the number of
laser pulses sent by Alice until the conditions are fulfilled.
4. Generation of raw key and error estimation. First,
a raw key pair (XA,XB) is generated by choosing a
random sample of size nX =
∑
k∈K nX,k of X = ∪k∈KXk,
where nX is the post-processing block size. Note that
we use all intensity levels for the key generation, while
existing decoy-state QKD protocols typically use only
one intensity level. Second, they announce the sets Zk
and compute the corresponding number of bit errors,
mZ,k. Third, they calculate the number of vacuum events
sX,0 [Eq. (2)] and the number of single-photon events sX,1
[Eq. (3)] in (XA,XB). Also, they calculate the number
of phase errors cX,1 [Eq. (5)] in the single-photon events.
Finally, they check that the phase error rate φX is less
than φtol where φtol is a predetermined phase error rate,
φX := cX,1/sX,1 < φtol. If this condition is not met,
they abort the protocol, otherwise they proceed to step 5.
5. Post-processing. First, Alice and Bob perform an
error-correction step that reveals at most leakEC bits of
information. In this step, we assume that they try to
correct for an error rate that is predetermined. Next,
to ensure that they share a pair of identical keys, they
perform an error-verification step using two-universal
hash functions that publishes ⌈log2 1/εhash⌉ bits of
information [26]. Here, εhash is the probability that a
pair of non-identical keys passes the error-verification
step. Finally, conditioned on passing this last step, they
perform privacy amplification on their keys to extract a
secret key pair (SA,SB) where |SA| = |SB| = ℓ bits.
Security bounds. Before we state the security
bounds for our protocol, it is instructive to spell out the
security criteria that we are using. For some small pro-
tocol errors, εcor, εsec > 0, we say that our protocol is
εcor + εsec-secure if it is εcor-correct and εsec-secret. The
former is satisfied if Pr[SA 6= SB] ≤ εcor, i.e., the secret
keys are identical except with a small probability εcor.
The latter is satisfied if (1−pabort)‖ρAE−UA⊗ρE‖1/2 ≤
εsec where ρAE is the classical-quantum state describing
the joint state of SA and E, UA is the uniform mixture
of all possible values of SA, and pabort is the probabil-
ity that the protocol aborts. Importantly, this secrecy
criterion guarantees that the protocol is universally com-
posable: the pair of secret keys can be safely used in any
cryptographic task, e.g., for encrypting messages, that
requires a perfectly secure key [27].
In the following, we present only the necessary for-
mulas to compute the security bounds; the full security
analysis is deferred to the supplementary material.
The correctness of the protocol is guaranteed by the
error-verification step. This step ensures that Bob’s cor-
rected key is identical to Alice’s key with probability at
least 1 − εhash, which implies that the final secret keys
(SA, SB) are identical with probability at least 1− εhash.
Therefore, the correctness of the protocol is εcor = εhash.
Conditioned on passing the checks in the error-
estimation and error-verification steps, a εsec-secret key
of length
ℓ =
⌊
sX,0 + sX,1 − sX,1h (φX)
− leakEC − 6 log2
21
εsec
− log2
2
εcor
⌋
, (1)
can be extracted, where h(x) := −x log2 x − (1 −
x) log2(1 − x) is the binary entropy function. Recall
that sX,0, sX,1 and φX = cX,1/sX,1 are the number of
vacuum events, the number of single-photon events, and
the phase error rate associated with the single-photons
events in XA, respectively. Next, we show how to calcu-
late them in two steps.
First, we extend the decoy-state analysis proposed in
Ref. [28] to the case of finite sample sizes. Accordingly,
the number of vacuum events in XA satisfies
sX,0 ≥ τ0
µ2n
−
X,µ3
− µ3n
+
X,µ2
µ2 − µ3
, (2)
where τn :=
∑
k∈K e
−kknpk/n! is the probability that
3Alice sends a n-photon state, and
n±
X,k :=
ek
pk
[
nX,k ±
√
nX
2
log
21
εsec
]
, ∀ k ∈ K.
The number of single-photon events in XA is
sX,1 ≥
τ1µ1
[
n−
X,µ2
− n+
X,µ3
− µ
2
2
−µ2
3
µ2
1
(n+
X,µ1
− sX,0τ0 )
]
µ1(µ2 − µ3)− µ22 + µ
2
3
. (3)
We also calculate the number of vacuum events, sZ,0,
and the number of single-photon events, sZ,1, for Z =
∪k∈KZk, i.e., by using Eqs. (2) and (3) with statistics
from the basis Z. In addition, the number of bit errors
vZ,1 associated with the single-photon events in Z is also
required. It is given by
vZ,1 ≤ τ1
m+
Z,µ2
−m−
Z,µ3
µ2 − µ3
, (4)
where
m±
Z,k :=
ek
pk
[
mZ,k ±
√
mZ
2
log
21
εsec
]
, ∀ k ∈ K,
and mZ =
∑
k∈KmZ,k.
Second, the formula for the phase error rate of the
single-photon events in XA is [29]
φX :=
cX,1
sX,1
≤
vZ,1
sZ,1
+ γ
(
εsec,
vZ,1
sZ,1
, sZ,1, sX,1
)
, (5)
where
γ (a, b, c, d) :=
√
(c+ d)(1 − b)b
cd log 2
log2
(
c+ d
cd(1− b)b
212
a2
)
.
Evaluation. We consider a fiber-based QKD system
model that borrows parameters from recent decoy-state
QKD and single-photon detector experiments. In partic-
ular, we assume that Alice can set the intensity of each
laser pulse to one of the three predetermined intensity
levels, µ1, µ2, and µ3 = 2 × 10−4 [30]. Bob uses an
active measurement setup with two single-photon detec-
tors (InGaAs APDs): they have a detection efficiency of
ηBob = 10%, a dark count probability of pdc = 6 × 10−7
and an after-pulse probability of pap = 4 × 10−2 [31].
The measurement has four possible outcomes {0, 1, ∅,⊥}
which correspond to bit values 0, 1, no detection and
double detection.
The system model is applied to two types of chan-
nel architectures, namely one that uses a dedicated op-
tical fiber for the quantum channel and one that uses
dense wavelength division multiplexing (DWDM) to put
the quantum channel together with the classical channels
into one optical fiber (e.g., see Refs. [32–34]). In both
cases, we assume that the fibers have an attenuation
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FIG. 1. Secret key rate vs fiber length (dedicated
fiber). Numerically optimized secret key rates (in logarith-
mic scale) are obtained for a fixed post-processing block size
nX = 10
s with s = 4, 5, . . . , 9 (from left to right). The dashed
curve corresponds to the asymptotic secret key rate, i.e., in
the limit of infinitely large keys; however, here we still assume
that the number of intensity levels is three. The number of
laser pulses sent by Alice can be approximated with the secret
key rate and the block size, i.e., N ≤ nX/R.
coefficient of 0.2 dB/km. That is, their transmittance
is ηch = 10
−0.2L/10, where L (km) is the fiber length.
The considered channel architectures, however, do not
have the same channel error model. For the dedicated
fiber, the probability of having a bit error for inten-
sity k is ek = pdc + emis[1 − exp(−ηchk)] + papDk/2,
where emis is the error rate due to optical errors. Here,
the expected detection rate (excluding after-pulse con-
tributions) is Dk = 1 − (1 − 2pdc) exp(−ηsysk), where
ηsys = ηchηBob. The expected detection rate (including
after-pulse contributions) is thus Rk = Dk(1+ ppa). The
channel error model for the DWDM architecture is more
involved due to additional noise contributions from Ra-
man scattering and cross-talks between channels. We
refer to Ref. [33] for details about it.
The parameter leakEC is set to a simple function
fECh(eobs) where fEC is the error-correction efficiency
and eobs is the average of the observed error rates in
basis X (we note that very recently, a more accurate the-
oretical model of leakEC has been derived in Ref. [35]). In
practice, however, leakEC should be set to the size of the
information exchanged during the error-correction step.
Regarding the secrecy, we set εsec to be proportional to
the secret key length, that is, εsec = κℓ where κ is a se-
curity constant; this security constant can be seen as the
secrecy leakage per generated bit.
For the evaluation, we numerically optimize
the secret key rate R := ℓ/N over the free
parameters {qx, pµ1 , pµ2 , µ1, µ2} given that the
set {κ, εcor, emis, fEC, L, nX} is fixed. Specifically,
we fix κ = 10−15, εcor = 10
−15, emis = 5 × 10−3 and
fEC = 1.16, and generate curves (see Fig. 1) for a range
of realistic post-processing block sizes, i.e., nX = 10
s
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FIG. 2. Secret key rate vs fiber length (DWDM). We
consider a (4+1) DWDM channel architecture [33] that puts
four classical channels and one quantum channel into an op-
tical fiber. In the simulation, we take that each classical
channel has a power of −34 dBm at the receiver [36]. Nu-
merically optimized secret key rates (in logarithmic scale) are
obtained for a fixed post-processing block size nX = 10
s with
s = 4, 5, . . . , 9 (from left to right). The dashed curve corre-
sponds to the asymptotic secret key rate, i.e., in the limit of
infinitely long keys.
with s = 4, 5, . . . , 9. From Fig. 1, we see that the security
performances corresponding to block sizes 107, 108 and
109 have only slight differences. For example, at a
fiber length of 100 km, the secret key rate obtained
with nX = 10
9 is about 1.75 times of the one based on
nX = 10
7. This suggests that it may not be necessary to
go to large block sizes (where computational resources
are high) to gain significant improvements. On the other
hand, for block sizes 104, 105 and 106, there is a distinct
advantage in terms of the secret key rate and fiber length
for larger block sizes. This is expected since smaller
block sizes correspond to larger statistical fluctuations
in the estimation process. Interestingly, we see that even
if we use a block size of 104, cryptographic keys can still
be distributed over a fiber length of 135 km. The same
trend is observed for the DWMD channel architecture
(see Fig. 2).
Concluding remarks. Although our security bounds
are rather general and can be applied to a wide class of
implementations, some conditions on the implementation
are still required. In particular, we require that the prob-
ability of having a detection in Bob’s measurement de-
vice is independent of his basis choice. This condition is
normally met when the detectors are operating accord-
ing to specification. However, if the detectors are not
implemented correctly, then there may be serious secu-
rity consequences, e.g., see Ref [37]; see also Ref. [38] for
the corresponding counter-measures. Alternatively, one
can adopt the recently proposed measurement-device-
independent QKD (mdiQKD) [39] to remove the afore-
mentioned condition; in other words, to remove all de-
tector side-channels. We note, however, that the imple-
mentation of mdiQKD is more complex than the one of
decoy-state QKD, and the achievable finite-key secret key
rates are typically lower [40].
In summary, we have provided tight finite-key security
bounds for a practical decoy-state QKD protocol that
can be applied to existing QKD implementations. More
importantly, these bounds are secure against general
attacks, and can be easily computed by referring to
just five concise formulas, i.e., Eqs. (1)-(5). On the
application side, we also see that secret keys can be
securely distributed over large distances with rather
small post-processing block sizes. Accordingly, this
allows existing QKD implementations to speed up their
key-distillation processes.
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6SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
Here, we provide the details for the security bounds
presented in the main text. The security analysis is
a combination of a proof technique based on entropic
uncertainty relations [1] and a novel finite-size analysis
for the two-decoy-state method. In the following, we
first present the details for the decoy-state analysis.
A. Decoy-state analysis for three intensity levels
Recall that our two-decoy-state method consists in Al-
ice setting the intensity of each laser pulse to one of the
three intensity levels, µ1, µ2 and µ3, where µ1 > µ2 + µ3
and µ2 > µ3 ≥ 0. Crucially, from the perspective of the
eavesdropper, the final prepared state (i.e., with the en-
coded bit value) appears the same to her regardless of
the choice of intensity level (or equivalently, the average
photon-number). Therefore, one can imagine an equiva-
lent counter-factual protocol: one in which Alice has the
ability to send n-photon states, and she only decides on
the choice of the average photon-number after Bob has
a detection. In the following, we provide the analysis for
the X basis; the same analysis applies to the Z basis.
Consider the case whereby Alice encodes the states
in the X basis and let sX,n be the number of detections
observed by Bob given that Alice sent n-photon states.
Note that
∑∞
n=0 sX,n = nX is the total number of detec-
tions given that Alice sent states prepared in the X basis.
In the asymptotic limit, we expect nX,k events from nX
events to be assigned to the intensity k, that is,
nX,k → n
∗
X,k =
∞∑
n=0
pk|nsX,n, ∀k ∈ K = {µ1, µ2, µ3},
where pk|n is the conditional probability of choosing the
intensity k given that Alice prepared a n-photon state.
For finite sample sizes, using Hoeffding’s inequality for
independent events [2], we have that nX,k satisfies∣∣n∗X,k − nX,k∣∣ ≤ δ(nX, ε1), (1)
with probability at least 1 − 2ε1, where δ(nX, ε1) :=√
nX/2 log(1/ε1). Note that the deviation term δ(nX, ε1)
is the same for all values of k. Basically, Eq. (1) allows
us to establish a relation between the asymptotic values
and the observed statistics (i.e., nX,µ1 , nX,µ2 and nX,µ3).
Moreover, the same relation can also be made for the
expected number of errors and the observed number of
errors. Let vX,n be the number of errors associated with
sX,n, then in the asymptotic limit, we expect mX,k errors
from mX errors to be assigned to the intensity k, i.e.,
mX,k → m
∗
X,k =
∞∑
n=0
pk|nvX,n, ∀k ∈ K = {µ1, µ2, µ3}.
Using Hoeffding’s inequality [2], we thus have for all val-
ues of k, ∣∣m∗X,k −mX,k∣∣ ≤ δ(mX, ε2), (2)
which holds with probability at least 1− 2ε2.
For the moment, we keep these relations aside; they
will be needed later when we apply the decoy-state anal-
ysis (to be detailed below) to the observed statistics.
1. Lower-bound on the number of vacuum events
An analytical lower-bound on sX,0 can be established
by exploiting the structure of the conditional probabili-
ties pk|n. First of all, we note that with Bayes’ rule, for
all k, we have
pk|n =
pk
τn
pn|k =
pk
τn
e−kkn
n!
, (3)
where τn :=
∑
k∈K pke
−kkn/n! is the probability that
Alice prepares a n-photon state. Using this and following
an approach proposed by [3], we have that
µ2e
µ3n∗
X,µ3
pµ3
−
µ3e
µ2n∗
X,µ2
pµ2
=
(µ2 − µ3)sX,0
τ0
− µ2µ3
∞∑
n=2
(µn−12 − µ
n−1
3 )sX,n
n!τn
,
where the second term on the r.h.s. is non-negative for
µ2 > µ3. Rewriting the above expression for sX,0 gives
sX,0 ≥
τ0
(µ2 − µ3)
(
µ2e
µ3n∗
X,µ3
pµ3
−
µ3e
µ2n∗
X,µ2
pµ2
)
. (4)
Note that this lower-bound is tight when µ3 → 0.
2. Lower-bound on the number of single-photon events
The lower-bound for the number of single-photon
events is slightly more involved, but it can be demon-
strated in three concise steps.
First, note that
eµ2n∗
X,µ2
pµ2
−
eµ3n∗
X,µ3
pµ3
=
(µ2 − µ3)sX,1
τ1
+
∞∑
n=2
(µn2 − µ
n
3 )sX,n
n!τn
≤
(µ2 − µ3)sX,1
τ1
+
µ22 − µ
2
3
µ21
∞∑
n=2
µn1 sX,n
n!τn
,
where the inequality is due to
µn2 − µ
n
3 =
(µ22 − µ
2
3)
(µ2 + µ3)
n−1∑
i=0
µn−i−12 µ
i
3
≤ (µ22 − µ
2
3)(µ2 + µ3)
n−2 ≤ (µ22 − µ
2
3)µ
n−2
1 ,
7for n ≥ 2 and µ2 + µ3 ≤ µ1. Note that we used∑n−1
i=0 µ
n−i−1
2 µ
i
3 ≤ (µ2 + µ3)
n−1 for n ≥ 2.
Second, using the fact that the sum of multi-photon
events is given by
∞∑
n=2
µn1 sX,n
n!τn
=
eµ1n∗
X,µ1
pµ1
−
sX,0
τ0
−
µ1sX,1
τ1
,
we further get,
eµ2n∗
X,µ2
pµ2
−
eµ3n∗
X,µ3
pµ3
≤
(µ2 − µ3)sX,1
τ1
+
µ22 − µ
2
3
µ21
(
eµ1n∗
X,µ1
pµ1
−
sX,0
τ0
−
µ1sX,1
τ1
)
.
Finally, solving for sX,1 gives
sX,1 ≥
µ1τ1
µ1(µ2 − µ3)− (µ22 − µ
2
3)
[
eµ2n∗
X,µ2
pµ2
−
eµ3n∗
X,µ3
pµ3
+
µ22 − µ
2
3
µ21
(
sX,0
τ0
−
eµ1n∗
X,µ1
pµ1
)]
. (5)
3. Upper-bound on the number of single-photon errors
An upper-bound on the number of single-photon errors
can be obtained with justm∗
X,µ2
andm∗
X,µ3
, i.e., by taking
eµ2m∗
X,µ2
/pµ2 − e
µ3m∗
X,µ3
/pµ3 , it is easy to show that
vX,1 ≤
τ1
µ2 − µ3
(
eµ2m∗
X,µ2
pµ2
−
eµ3m∗
X,µ3
pµ3
)
. (6)
4. Finite-size decoy-state analysis
The bounds given above are still not applicable to the
observed statistics since Eqs. (4), (5) and (6) involve
terms that are valid only in the asymptotic limit, i.e.,
{n∗
X,k}k∈K and {m
∗
X,k}k∈K. However, this is easily re-
solved by using Eqs. (1) and (2). Specifically, let
n∗X,k ≤ nX,k + δ(nX, ε1) =: n˜
+
X,k, (7)
n∗X,k ≥ nX,k − δ(nX, ε1) =: n˜
−
X,k, (8)
and
m∗X,k ≤ mX,k + δ(mX, ε2) =: m˜
+
X,k, (9)
m∗
X,k ≥ mX,k − δ(mX, ε2) =: m˜
−
X,k, . (10)
for all values of k. Putting them into Eqs. (4), (5) and (6),
we thus have the formulas as stated in the main text.
B. Secrecy analysis
The secrecy analysis roughly follows along the lines of
Ref. [5], i.e., we use a certain family of entropic uncer-
tainty relations to establish bounds on the smooth min-
entropy of the raw key conditioned on Eve’s information.
To start with, let system E′ be the information that
Eve gathers on XA, i.e., the raw key of Alice, up to the
error-verification step. By applying privacy amplification
with two-universal hashing [6], a εsec-secret key of length
ℓ can be extracted from XA. Specifically, the secret key
is εsec-secret if ℓ is chosen such that
ℓ =
⌊
Hνmin
(
XA|E
′
)
− 2 log2
1
2ν
⌋
, (11)
for ν + ν ≤ εsec where ν, ν are chosen to be proportional
to εsec/(1−pabort). Here, Hνmin
(
XA|E
′
)
is the conditional
smooth min-entropy, which quantifies the amount of un-
certainty system E′ has on XA. In fact, this quantity
is the heart of our security analysis. In the following,
we show how to bound Hνmin
(
XA|E
′
)
using statistics ob-
tained in the protocol.
First, using a chain-rule inequality for smooth en-
tropies, and the fact that leakEC-bits and log2 2/εcor-
bits of information were published during the error-
correction and error-verification steps, respectively, we
get Hνmin
(
XA|E
′
)
≥ Hνmin (XA|E)− leakEC− log2 2/εcor,
where system E is the remaining (possibly quantum) in-
formation Eve has on XA. In general, leakEC should be
determined by the amount of leakage the actual protocol
reveals during the error-correction step.
Second, we decompose XA into X
v
AX
s
AX
m
A , which are
the corresponding bit-strings due to the vacuum, single-
photon and multi-photon events. Note that this decom-
position is known to Eve, i.e., the decomposition informa-
tion is included inside system E. By using a generalized
chain-rule result from Ref. [7], we have that
Hνmin (XA|E) ≥ H
α1
min (X
s
A|X
v
AX
m
AE)
+Hα3+2α4+α5min (X
v
AX
m
A |E)− 2 log2
1
α2
− 1,
for ν = 2α1 + α2 + (α3 + 2α4 + α5) where αi > 0 for all
i. Next, we use the same chain-rule again on the second
term on the r.h.s. to get
Hα3+2α4+α5min (X
v
AX
m
A |E)
≥ Hα4min (X
m
A |X
v
AE) +H
α5
min (X
v
A|E)− 2 log2
1
α3
− 1
≥ sX,0− 2 log2
1
α3
− 1.
To get the second inequality, we used Hα4min (X
m
A |X
v
AE) ≥
0 and Hα5min (X
v
A|E) ≥ Hmin (X
v
A|E) = Hmin (X
v
A) =
log2 2
sX,0 = sX,0. The former is given by the fact that
all multi-photon events are taken to be insecure, i.e.,
due to the photon-number-splitting attack. The latter
is based on the assumption that vacuum contributions
8contain zero information about the chosen bit values and
the bits are uniformly distributed.
Third, we provide a bound on the remaining smooth
min-entropy quantity which is now restricted to the
single-photon events, i.e., via the uncertainty relation for
smooth entropies [4]. Under the assumption that Alice
prepares the states using mutually unbiased bases (i.e., X
is the computational basis and Z is the Hadamard basis),
we can further bound this quantity with the max-entropy
between Alice and Bob, which is directly given by the
amount of correlation between them [5]. More precisely,
we have
Hα1min (X
s
A|X
v
AX
m
AE) ≥ sX,1 −H
α1
max (Z
s
A|Z
s
B)
≥ sX,1
[
1− h
(
cX,1
sX,1
)]
,
where the first inequality is given by the uncertainty re-
lation [4] and the smooth max-entropy Hα1max (Z
s
A|Z
s
B) is
a measure of correlations between ZsA and Z
s
B. Here, Z
s
A
and ZsB are the bit strings Alice and Bob would have ob-
tained if they had measured in the basis Z instead. The
second inequality is achieved by using Hα1max (Z
s
A|Z
s
B) ≤
sX,1h(cX,1/sX,1) (see [5, Lemma 3]), where cX,1 is the
number of phase errors in the single-photon events. Here,
the number of phase errors cX,1 has to be estimated via a
random-sampling theory (without replacement) as these
errors are not directly observed in the protocol. More
concretely, by using a random-sampling without replace-
ment result given in Ref. [8] which is based on an approx-
imation technique for the hyper-geometric distribution,
we have with probability at least 1− α1,
cX,1
sX,1
≤
vZ,1
sZ,1
+ γ
(
α1,
vZ,1
sZ,1
, sZ,1, sX,1
)
, (12)
where
γ (a, b, c, d) :=
√
(c+ d)(1− b)b
cd log 2
log2
(
c+ d
cd(1− b)b
1
a2
)
.
Fourth, putting everything together, we arrive at a se-
cret key length of
ℓ =
⌊
sX,0+sX,1
[
1− h
(
cX,1
sX,1
)]
−leakEC−log2
2
εcorβ
⌋
,
(13)
where β := (α2α3ν)
2. Note that sX,0, sX,1, sZ,0, sZ,1,
vZ,1 are to be bounded by Eqs. (4)-(6) using the relations
given by Eqs. (7)-(10).
Finally, after composing the error terms due to finite-
sample sizes and setting α4 = α5 = 0, the secrecy is
εsec = 2 [2α1 + α2 + α3] + ν + 10ε1 + 2ε2. (14)
To get the secrecy given in the main text we set each
error term to a common value ε, thus εsec = 21ε.
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